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The phenomenon of  sustained commodity price rises that has char- 
acterized both industrial and less developed economies in the past three 
decades is only the most recent such episode in the long historical 
record of secular price changes. This suggests that price history merits 
some investigation for the light it may throw on contemporary price 
experience. 
Before we can hope to interpret the record of history, we need some 
provisional model to focus our attention on the few variables that might 
conceivably explain secular price changes. We  can then test the model 
by the historical record. If the inferences drawn from the model do not 
conflict with the record, the model will survive to the next test. 
The key variable that I associate with secular price movements is 
the ratio of the money stock to real output, a rise in the ratio matching 
secular price inflation, a decline matching secular price deflation. This 
by  itself does not tell us whether  the  ratio is changing because  of 
influences from the side of money or from the side of output.  On a 
priori grounds, however, a wider possible range of variation may be 
expected in the numerator than in the denominator of the ratio. At any 
moment in time, given resources and technology determine real output. 
Over time, real output will grow, apart from cyclical disturbances and 
wars (in earlier centuries, also plagues), but sudden, abrupt discontin- 
uities in level are unlikely. On the other hand, by various devices the 
money stock can be augmented or reduced very sharply in a brief time 
span, and the historical record provides rich evidence on the use of 
such devices. 
A positive link between changes in the money stock per unit of output 
and secular price  movements does not  imply a simple proportional 
relationship between changes in the money stock and changes in the 
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price level.'  In addition, once a price movement establishes itself, it 
tends to be reinforced by its effect on expectations, rising prices leading 
to a rise in velocity, falling prices to a fall in velocity. Finally, although 
commodity price movements bear the initial impact of a secular change 
in money stock per unit of output, the impact then spreads to factor 
prices and to interest rates, as cooperating agents of production come 
to anticipate inflation or deflation. Thus, money wages tend to rise 
faster and interest rates tend to be higher during periods of secular 
price rise than of price fall. 
Ideally, one would need data on money supply, real output, com- 
modity  prices,  money  wages,  and interest  rates  to test the model. 
Clearly, a full set of  such data is unavailable except for recent decades 
for most countries. I propose, therefore, on the basis of  admittedly 
unsatisfactory data the further back in time one goes, first, to sketch 
what evidence there is for past episodes of price change, in the process 
commenting on alternative models that have been suggested, and sec- 
ond, to draw some conclusions from this evidence. 
The episodes I shall comment on cover a time span of 24  millenia, 
so I cannot pretend to give more than a very  superficial account of 
material drawn from writings of specialized scholars of the past with 
rather different interests from mine. Chronologically the episodes may 
be divided  into four periods:  (1) from antiquity  through  the fourth 
century of the Christian era; (2) from the fifth through  the fifteenth 
centuries-the  Middle Ages; (3) from the sixteenth century to the Na- 
poleonic Wars; (4) from the nineteenth century through the early 1930s. 
3.1  Antiquity 
Three  developments of  Graeco-Roman  times  are relevant to this 
survey. One is the contrast between Greek and Roman monetary ar- 
rangements. The second is the monetary experience of  the Hellenistic 
world following Alexander the Great's  conquest of the Persians (330 
B.c.).  The third is the monetary crisis at the beginning of the 4th century 
A.D.  in the Roman Empire. 
a. From the fifth century B.c., Athenian silver coins of uniform fine- 
ness and weight became the prevailing standard not only among other 
Greek city-states but also among Attic trading partners in Asia Minor. 
Athens did not tamper with her coinage even when the state treasury 
was bare and when military needs were urgent.  Rome, on the other 
hand, even when its monetary system was far less advanced than that 
of Greece, had a history of debasement. In the two centuries before 
the Punic Wars, it debased its copper coinage. During the next two 
centuries, when silver was introduced, it debased both silver and cop- 
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amount of fine metals. Gold coins came into use at the beginning of 
the Empire in 30  B.C.  For the next four hundred years, debasements 
were again the rule (Glotz 1926, pp. 230-37;  Louis 1927, pp. 80-84, 
Why  Greek and Roman practice  should have been  so different  I 
cannot say. There is evidence of persistent inflation under the Empire, 
but I cannot report that price stability characterized Classical Greece. 
The reason is that, though there are numerous relative price statistics, 
with one exception to which I shall refer in a moment, I do not know 
of reliable documentation of price level changes. The other bit of evi- 
dence related to  the contrast in monetary arrangements between Greece 
and Rome is that  interest rates on  “normal”  loans, comparable to 
modern personal loans, declined in Greece from 16 percent in 550 to 
6 percent in 250 B.c., and then remained stable to 50 B.c.;  whereas in 
the Roman  Empire, they rose from 4 percent  in  A.D.  50 to over  12 
percent  by  A.D. 250 (Homer  1963, p.  64; Louis  1927, pp.  317-18). 
There were clearly influences other than monetary arrangements af- 
fecting the levels of interest rates, but the contrasting trends in interest 
rates under the two regimes are in line with a dominant monetary effect. 
b. The one case of a documented price level change in the annals of 
ancient Greece occurred as a consequence of Alexander the Great’s 
conquest of the Persian kingdom (330 B.c.)  Immense hoards of Persian 
gold were introduced by him into the Greek economy, transforming a 
silver into a predominantly gold standard. Prices and wages increased 
not only in Greece but also throughout the Hellenistic empire, as gold 
coinage was diffused through trade in markets from India and Egypt 
to Western Mediterranean lands. There is some reason to believe that 
prices were more unstable during the aftermath of Alexander’s con- 
quests than in earlier or following centuries of antiquity (Michell 1946; 
Heichelheim 1935, pp. 1-2). 
c. The Emperor Diocletian in  A.D.  296 tried to reform the chaotic 
state of the Roman currency by introducing full-weight gold and silver 
coins and a new bronze coin. This action might have been expected to 
stabilize prices but an overwhelming increase in the money stock su- 
pervened. Two alternative explanations have been advanced to account 
for the sources of  the increase. One is that it occurred in the supply 
of precious metals from three sources: from (1) Diocletian’s conquests 
in the East; (2) temple treasures that were dishoarded with the decline 
of paganism; and (3) private stocks transferred under compulsion to 
the imperial account. The last source would have contributed a net 
increase only if  the Emperor coined metal transferred to his account 
that was not previously used in private transactions. This explanation 
has been rejected as  unsubstantiated and replaced by one stressing that 
prices were fixed not in silver or in gold but in bronze (or copper). The 
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source of the increase in the money stock, on this view, was the man- 
ufacture of copper coins. In any event, a pronounced price inflation 
followed, which Diocletian attempted to repress by issuing in A.D.  301 
an Edict on Maximum Prices. Of price ceilings covering 900 commod- 
ities, 130 grades of labor, and various freight rates, the sections of the 
Edict in existence list maximum prices for 100 articles and wages rang- 
ing from a common laborer’s to a lawyer’s, the penalty for exceeding 
the maximum being death for both buyer and seller. The system of 
price control was a failure. Numerous death penalties, disturbances in 
the labor market, and the disappearance of new output from the product 
market characterized the period until A.D.  305 that the price edict was 
in effect. In that year Diocletian abdicated (Mattingly 1928, pp. 217, 
222-27,232-34;  Michelll947, pp. 1-3; West 1951, pp. 300-301;  Jones 
1953). 
3.2  The Middle Ages 
For almost a thousand years there are no statistics for either com- 
modity prices or interest rates.  Following the sack of  Rome in 410, 
Western Europe was held by barbarian kingdoms. Barter transactions 
became common in domestic trade, while international trade declined. 
In the East, the Byzantine Empire, the successor of the Asiatic portion 
of the Roman Empire, revived the Classical Greek-tradition of an in- 
trinsically stable and uniform coinage, in this case, of gold. Its coinage 
became accepted in international trade. Not until the eighth century 
was the monopoly of Byzantine coins in international use broken. Then 
a new Moslem Arabic coin, the symbol of Arabic ascendance in Asia 
Minor, North Africa,  and Spain, gained wide acceptability.  In later 
medieval Europe, a variety  of  silver coins, issued by  ecclesiastics, 
feudal lords, and kings-often debased-was  in local use. By the thir- 
teenth century, with the expansion of trade, Italian merchant republics 
began to coin gold, the coin of  Florence in particular becoming the 
favored  means  of international payment.  Later in the century, gold 
coinage was established in France and, in the fourteenth century, also 
in  England, Flanders,  Castile and Aragon, and Germany (Spufford 
Fragmentary price quotations, available for a few English and French 
commodities, indicate that prices were higher at the end than at the 
beginning of the thirteenth century. Even if it could be established that 
the movement is not a statistical artifact, the explanation of the rise 
would remain to be determined. Coinage, population,  and output all 
increased over the century. Of  these factors, presumably only the in- 
crease in coinage would be expected to raise the general level of prices. 
Interest rate quotations are too sporadic to suggest any trend. 
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For the fourteenth century, price history is less scanty. The effect 
on prices of repeated changes in the silver coinage in France has been 
compared with that of relative stability of the silver coinage in England. 
The advantage of such an international comparison is that it enables 
one to treat as ceteris paribus contemporary nonmonetary factors, such 
as wars, famine, plague, and institutional changes, which can be shown 
to have had common effects on both countries, and to concentrate on 
the effects of monetary factors. Over the century, French kings ordered 
thirty-two changes in the maximum number of livres-the  French unit 
of account until the Revolution-struck  from a standard silver mark, 
the maximum number ranging from 2.9  to 125 livres per mark. The 
changes alternated between restorations and debasements of the me- 
tallic content of the coin. In the fourteenth century, by contrast, English 
alterations of silver money were relatively few and limited in size. If 
for each year, a comparison is made between the maximum price of 
wheat quoted in each country (actually, prices in the vicinity of Ox- 
fordshire and in Chartres and Paris), on the assumption that it was the 
maximum that was paid in the most debased money, the movements 
of the French and English series, each expressed in the monetary units 
in which they existed, with no reference to the metal content of the 
unit of account, are usually diverse. However, when the prices in each 
country are expressed in money of constant metallic value and the units 
made comparable between the two, the movements of the two series 
are similar enough to suggest that French prices fully adjusted to al- 
terations of the coinage, whether there was peace or war, famine or 
plenty, military success or failure (Miskimin 1963, pp. 37-38,  47, 82). 
The comparative analysis is of particular interest, in view of difficulty 
in reconciling money supply and price estimates in the case of alter- 
ations of English coinage in the sixteenth century. Before turning to 
that episode, let me summarize the evidence on price and wage trends 
at the close of the Middle Ages in France, England, and three Spanish 
provinces  that were then independent kingdoms (table 3.1). A price 
rise in the third quarter of  the fourteenth century was the result of a 
sharp decline in population and output, due to the spread of  bubonic 
plague through Europe, while the supply of money was increasing. The 
sources of  that increase included the discovery of gold in Silesia and 
Hungary; an increase in trade  with  goldmining countries of  north- 
western Africa; debasement of, and a rise in money of account values 
assigned  to, existing coinage. In the final quarter of  the fourteenth 
century the trend of prices was declining, though Navarre is an excep- 
tion; the price rise there is attributable to deliberate monetary expan- 
sion that offset a decline in prices quoted in gold. Elsewhere, the decline 
in prices reflected the resumption of vigorous population growth, and 
an increase in output, with no significant change in the money supply. 
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Table 3.1  Comparison of Rates of Change in Prices and Money Wages in 
Selected Countries at the Close of the Middle Ages (in Money of 
Account, Percent Per Year) 
England  France  Aragon  Navarre  Valencia 
Series and Period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
~~~~~~  ~~ 
Prices: 
1326-50  to 1351-75  1.2  1.9  3.6  2.4 
1351-75  to 1376-1400  -  1.0  -0.9  -1.0  2.1 
1376-1400  to 1476-1500  0  0  0  -0.1 
Money wages: 
1326-50  to 1351-75  1.3  1.9  2.4 
1351-75  to 1376-1400  0.1  -0.5  3.1 
1376-  1400 to 1476-  1500  0.2  0.4  0 
Source: (by column): 
(1)  Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins,  1956, pp. 311-12.  Prices refer to a “composite 
unit of consumables” ;  wages refer to builders’ wages in Southern England. Quarter-century 
averages were computed from annual figures for prices and real wages. Annual figures for 
the latter are lacking in some cases.  Money wages were computed by multiplying real 
wages by the price indexes. 
(2)  Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins, 1957, p. 305. Original source is Viscomte d’Avenel 
(Histoire Economique  de la  PropriCtC, des Salaires,  des DenrCes,  et de  Tous Prix  en 
Gdndral, Paris, 1894-  1926, Vols. I-VII),  on the basis of whose collection, index numbers 
were constructed by Georg Wiebe, Zur Geschichte der Preisrevolution des XVI and XVII 
Jahrhunderts, Leipzig, 1895. Prices refer to composite unit of consumables; wages refer 
to builders’ wages. 
(3-5)  Hamilton, 1936a, pp. 59, 105, 162 (prices), 74, 115, 183 (wages). Quarter-century 
averages were computed from annual figures. For Aragon, a single annual figure is available 
for the first two quarter-centuries,  with occasional gaps thereafter  in the price series. 
Wages are reported beginning the last quinquennial of the 14th century. For Navarre, index 
numbers for prices are limited to only three, and for wages are limited to only one annual 
figure for the first quarter-century. The series for prices ends in 1445, for wages, in 1450. 
For Valencia, prices and wages are available beginning in the last decade of the 14th century. 
Note: Rate of change is the difference between the natural logarithms of the average values 
of index numbers of the terminal and initial periods divided by the time interval between 
their mid-points. 
fifteenth century by the spread of the money economy and specie flows 
to the Far East in payment for spices and luxury goods, yet general 
price stability characterized the period. Debasements and the marking- 
up of  existing coinage apparently offset the deflationary forces (Ham- 
ilton 1936a, pp. 124-28,  193-204). 
Money wages also rose as the Black Death struck, and continued to 
rise or decline less than prices over the next century and a quarter. 
Again, it is difficult to determine a trend in interest rates from the 
available quotations. 
3.3  From the Sixteenth to the Close of the Eighteenth Century 
For the English experiment in the sixteenth century with alterations 
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available. From May 1542 to mid-1551, Henry VIII and his successor, 
Edward VI, ordered progressive increases in the value assigned to fine 
gold and silver in the money of account. They reduced the weight of 
coins, increased the proportion of alloy in them, or else placed a higher 
value on existing coin with no change in their physical character. Private 
individuals  and the government had  an incentive to remint  existing 
coins so long as their face value before deduction of seignorage was 
less than the price in newly minted coin which the Mint paid to a tender 
of their weight in fine silver. On government account, there was also 
an incentive to remint whenever seignorage charges exceeded the costs 
of reminting. In addition, there was appreciable monetization of plate 
and ornament the government obtained from suppressed religious or- 
ders (Gould 1970, pp. 71-86).  In less than a decade, the estimates of 
English money  supply more than doubled, while estimates of prices 
less than doubled (table 3.2). 
In August 1551, Edward VI called down the silver coinage, and the 
money  supply estimates show nearly a 50 percent decline. No com- 
parable change is registered in the annual price statistics. In the next 
nine years, the money  supply increased by one-third. Then in  1560 
Queen Elizabeth called down the base silver coinage, and the money 
supply estimates show an  18 percent  decline.  The price  estimates, 
however, reflect neither the growth nor the abrupt contraction revealed 
by the money supply estimates. 
This is the one episode I have come across for which the price data 
do not seem to reflect the behavior of money stock per unit of output. 
Perhaps the price statistics are at fault, perhaps the money stock es- 
timates.  Perhaps velocity responses to debasement or restoration of 
Table 3.2  Estimates of  English Money Supply and Prices, 1542-62 
(in Money of Account) 
Money Supply  hices 
(Thousand fs)  (1451-75  = loo) 
Date  (1)  (2) 
1542  848  172 
April  1546  1188  248 
early  1549  1755  214 
early  1551  2022 
July  1551  2171  285 
August  1551  1188 
Pre-calling down  1560  1581  265 





Source (by column): (1) Gould 1970, pp. 81-82;  (2) same as for table 1, col. (l),  prices. 85  Secular Price Change in Historical Perspective 
the currency produced offsetting effects. Did debasement encourage 
increased holding of existing coinage and a reduction in goods pur- 
chases, and did restoration encourage the opposite tendency? How- 
ever, until one or another of these explanations is tested and found 
satisfactory, this episode must be regarded as a contradiction to the 
basic hypothesis. 
It has been  suggested that debasements and coinage restorations 
should not be regarded as capricious actions taken by governments for 
revenue reasons, but instead as possibly stabilizing if debasements were 
instituted during periods when prices would otherwise have declined 
and restorations when prices would otherwise have risen. At the time 
the Great Debasement of  1546-51  began, prices in England had been 
rising at an annual rate of  1.3 percent per year since the turn of the 
century, although prices during the decade of the 1530s were relatively 
stable. Pursuing this line, one could argue that the intention of  de- 
basement was to insure the continuance of rising prices and of coinage 
restoration to slow the rate of price rise; hence both were stabilizing. 
The episode of the Great Debasement in England occurred during 
the course of a price rise that marked the sixteenth and early seven- 
teenth century in Europe, known as the Price Revolution. Compared 
with modern experience, the annual rates of price rise in various coun- 
tries over this time span hardly seem to warrant such a designation. 
The price statistics, however, are often not expressed in terms of  cur- 
rent coinage but are reduced to a silver basis, to facilitate comparison 
among countries. After correcting for the varying premium on silver, 
the price statistics show more modest rates of rise then would be the 
case if  they were expressed in current coinage. For France, rates of 
change in prices expressed in money of account can be compared with 
the corresponding rates when prices are expressed in silver. For En- 
gland, a similar comparison may be less reliable because the underlying 
indexes are not the same. In any event, table 3.3 shows both sets of 
results. 
For Spain, for which the most detailed price statistics on a silver 
basis are available, and the country where the Price Revolution first 
occurred, the continuously compounded rate of rise from the first de- 
cade of the sixteenth to the first decade of the seventeenth century is 
1.2 percent. For other European countries, for which statistics are less 
complete, the comparable annual rates of price rise are 1.0 (France 
and England) and 0.8 (Saxony). Expressed in money of account, the 
price rises for France and England are converted to 2.1 and 1.7 percent 
per year, respectively. Money wage rates also rose during the sixteenth 
century, on a silver basis in Spain, at 1.1 percent per year through the 
closing decade (at 1.3 percent if the following decade is included); in 
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Table 3.3  Comparison of  Rates of  Change in Prices and Money Wages in 
Selected Countries during the Price Revolution (Percent per Year) 
Prices  Money Wages 
in  in Money  in  in Money 




1.  1501-10  to 1601-10  1.2  1.3 
2.  1501-25  to 1576-1600  1 .o  2.1  0.3  1.1 
3.  1501-10  to 1593-1602  1  .o  1.7  0.3  0.8 
4.  1501-10  to 1581-90  1.5  1.4 
5.  1476-1500  to 1591-99  0.8 
Saxony: 
Source (by line): II.  1-3  and 5, prices and money wages in silver, from Hamilton 1929, 
pp.  352 (England) and 353  (France); Hamilton 1934, pp.  271 and 403 (Spain) and 209 
(Saxony). The original source of  the English figures is Thorold Rogers (A History  of 
Agriculture and Prices in England, Oxford, 1882-87,  Vols. III-VI),  on the basis of whose 
collection Georg Wiebe (see table 1, col.  1)  constructed index numbers. 1. 2, prices and 
money wages in money of  account, same as for Table 2.1,  col. 2.  11.  3-4,  prices and 
money wages in money of account, same as for table 2.1, col. 1. 
Note: Same as for table 2.1. 
year in the former, 1.4 percent in the latter through the ninth decade 
of the sixteenth century, following which money wages were essentially 
unchanged. Such interest rate quotations as exist suggest a sharp rise 
in their level during the course of the century. 
Let me digress from price history for a bit to discuss the two broad 
explanations of the Price Revolution that have coexisted from the time 
its impact was first recognized by  contemporaries. One explanation 
traced the price rise to an initial increase beginning in the last quarter 
of the fifteenth century in European silver output, which was dwarfed 
in the next century by an influx first of gold and later of silver from 
the  Spanish possessions in the New World  (Nef  1941, pp.  585-86; 
Hamilton 1934, pp. 293-302).  By 1660, the close of the period of Span- 
ish imports, the European stock of gold had nearly doubled, and the 
stock of silver had increased three and two-fifths times (Brenner 1961).* 
The precious metals that reached Spain first were dispersed to other 
European countries by unfavorable trade balances in Spain, due to the 
earlier impact of the increase in money supply on its prices, and by 
military expenditures and administrative expenses incurred in main- 
taining the Spanish empire. Hence the widespread scope of the Price 
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with the size of specie inflows, the amount diverted to nonmonetary 
uses,  the relative  growth  of  output,  and  the  spread  of  the  money 
economy. 
The second explanation traced the price rise to nonmonetary factors. 
The Spanish price  rise in the sixteenth century was ascribed to an 
expansion of European demand for Spanish wool and other products, 
the cessation of the price rise in the seventeenth century to ruinous 
taxation,  agricultural decay,  depopulation, and malfeasance  of busi- 
nessmen (Hamilton 1929). 
Several economic historians have seized on the second type of ex- 
planation. One objection they have raised against the monetary expla- 
nation is that it has to be shown that the increase in Spain’s stock of 
metals actually was dispersed through Europe, as asserted. The basis 
for this objection is the absence of a rise after the middle of the sixteenth 
century in figures for the quantity of woollen cloth exports from the 
port of London, the argument being that if  there were an outflow of 
specie from Spain, England should have had a favorable balance  of 
trade. _However, the woollen cloth exports are quantity figures, for 
which no export prices are available; the port of London was evidently 
declining, while other ports were rising in importance; and, finally, no 
value figures exist for imports; so no balance of trade data can be cited 
in support of the challenge. A  second objection is that prices were 
rising before American treasure could have had an appreciable effect. 
The rise in European silver output beginning in the last quarter of the 
fifteenth century, to which reference has been made, disposes of this 
point. A third objection is that if there were an increase in the money 
supply, the increase in volume of trade should have offset it. The answer 
is that the increase in the money supply was far greater than the increase 
in output. A fourth objection is that if the increase in the money supply 
produced the price change, why were there not similar effects on prices 
of all commodities and services. The question indeed is turned around: 
since some prices rose sharply, others rose less markedly, and still 
other prices fell, how could monetary increase possibly be a common 
explanation for the diversity? The preceding objection is grouped with 
a final one, namely, demographic changes can account for the differ- 
ential price changes without invoking monetary factors at all (Brenner 
1961, 1962; Gould 1964; Hammarstrom 1957). 
The theory of a causal relation between population and prices dis- 
tinguishes between agriculture and industrial prices. Given an increase 
in population and inelastic agricultural supply and demand, two con- 
sequences are deduced: (1) food prices rise sharply; (2) the increase in 
the labor force finds industrial employment, so industrial output rises, 
but as residual income left to wage-earners after providing themselves 
with food is limited,  demand for industrial  output is weak.  Conse- 88  Anna J. Schwartz 
quently, prices of agricultural goods with inelastic demand and supply 
rise more sharply than prices of elastic industrial goods. Accordingly, 
periods of  secular population  increase can be linked with periods of 
rising prices, periods of declining population with periods of stable or 
falling prices. 
The difficulty with this analysis is that it cannot explain why industrial 
prices rise at all during periods of population increase; under the stated 
conditions, they should fall. Moreover, although it is alleged that in 
periods of declining population,  supplies of food were plentiful and 
cheaper because marginal lands were abandoned, the theory cannot 
account for the rise in prices in the third  quarter of  the fourteenth 
century that accompanied the decline in population at the time of the 
Black Death. 
In any case, changes in relative prices tell us nothing about changes 
in the aggregate. Economic historians frequently display a bias against 
aggregates, in part, possibly, because aggregate data are lacking for 
past centuries. A charge they level against monetary analysis is that it 
deals only with aggregates. In addition, as noted, they allege that a 
monetary explanation to be valid implies a similar monetary effect on 
all prices. This is true but it does not follow that all prices will therefore 
move in unison. The common monetary effect has superimposed on it 
forces that affect relative prices. For particular commodities, the fac- 
tors affecting relative prices may be far more important than the com- 
mon monetary effect. However, the price of commodity X,  for example, 
can double with respect to commodity  Y by the absolute price of X 
doubling and the price of  Y staying the same, or by the absolute price 
of X  staying the same and the price of Y halving, or by any of an infinite 
number of other combinations. No amount of information on the factors 
affecting the relative  prices of X and  Y can explain which of  these 
alternatives will occur. That is the role of aggregate analysis. 
To  resume the description of the course of prices in the seventeenth 
century, Spanish prices reached a peak in the first decade of the sev- 
enteenth century, while English and French prices continued to rise 
until the middle of the century, in the French case with an interruption 
in the upward movement from  1600 to 1625. Up to 1650 a composite 
price index for all of Spain is available; thereafter only separate regional 
indexes exist (see table 3.4). The different behavior of Valencian and 
Castilian prices in the second half of the seventeenth century is of some 
interest. Prices in Valencia were declining from mid-century on, but 
they rose steeply in New Castile until 1680 and then reversed movement 
to the end of the century. The difference reflects the independent mon- 
etary system in Valencia, where the money of account was virtually 
constant in terms of  silver during the period, while Castilian money 
was progressively debased and overissue of fractional coins drove the Table 3.4  Comparison of Rates of Changes in Prices and Money Wages and Nominal Interest 
Rates, in Selected Countries during the 17th and 18th Centuries 
Prices  Money Wages 
Yields on Long-Term 
in  inMoney  in  in M~~~~  Government 
Silver  of Account  Silver  of Account  Skmhies 
Country and Period  (Percent per Year)  per Year) 
(Percent per Year 
Spain: 
Valencia: 
1.  1601-10  to 1641-50  -0.1 
2.  1651-55  to 1686-90 
4.  1721-25  to 1746-50 
3.  1701-05  to 1721-25 
5.  1751-55  to 1786-90 
New Castile: 
6.  1656-60  to 1676-80 
7.  1676-80  to 16%-1700 
8.  1701-05  to 1721-25 
9.  1721-25  to 1746-50 
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0.3 
0.4a 
0.3 Table 3.4  (continued) 
Prices  Money Wages 
Yields on Long-Term 
in  in Money  in  in M~~~~  Government 
Silver  of  Account  Silver  of  Account  Securities 
Country and Period  (Percent per Year)  per Year) 
(Percent per Year 
England: 
11.  1593-1602  to 1643-52 
13.  1593-1602  to 1710-19 
14.  1693-1702  to 1731-40 
15.  1731-40  to 1781-90 
12.  1643-52  to 1693-1702 
16.  1710-19  to 1781-90 
France: 
17.  1576-1600  to 1601-25 
18.  1601-25  to 1626-50 
19.  1626-50  to 1676-1700 
20.  1726-50  to 1751-75 
American Colonies: 
0.6  0.6 
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-1.1  -0.7 
1  .O  1.6 







0  0.2 
0.5  0.8 
0  0.5 
Source (by line): 1.  I, same as for table 3.3, line 1. 11.  2-5,  Hamilton 1947, pp.  121, 141, 157 (prices). Only 
fragmentary wage figures are given (p. 21 1).  II. 6-10,  same as for lines 2-5,  except money wage figures are 
given, beginning  1737 (p. 208). 11.  11-16,  prices and money wages, same as for table 3.3, lines 1 and 3-4; 
line 15, yields, Homer 1963, pp. 161-62.  II.  17-19,  same as for table 3.3, lines 1-2.1.  20, Warren and Pearson 
1932, pp. 7-8. 
Note:  Same as for table 3.1. 
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precious metals out of circulation. The premium on silver in Castile 
quintupled  between  1650 and  1680, when the inflation was abruptly 
halted (Hamilton 1947, pp. 27-32,  1121). The military, political, and 
economic decline of Spain during the seventeenth century is apparently 
not unrelated to the monetary disorders in Castile. In the eighteenth 
century, Spanish prices moved downward moderately until 1725, and 
the rose at a rate of under 1 percent per year until the closing decade. 
From 1650 to 1740, English prices moved within a narrow range, al- 
ternately rising and falling at rates well under l percent per year until 
the half-century before the outbreak of  the Napoleonic Wars, when 
they rose at 8 percent per year. 
Although it did not involve a secular change in the price level, let 
me interject a comment here on the British recoinage toward the end 
of  the seventeenth century. Two kinds of  silver coin were then in use, 
hammered ones minted before 1663 and milled ones introduced there- 
after.  Hammered coins differed in weight when issued, were easily 
clipped, and wore down in use. The milled coins were more uniform 
when issued, resisted clipping because of the raised and grooved rim, 
and did not show wear. By the early 1690s, the contrast between the 
condition of the two kinds of coin eroded confidence in the clipped and 
worn ones. In the second half of  1695, the efforts of holders of these 
coins to exchange them for gold guineas and commodities led to a rise 
in the sterling value of the guineas from twenty-one to thirty shillings, 
and an increase in the monthly prices of a sample of nonagricultural 
commodities at an annual rate of 23 percent. The price rise was also 
a response to a  19 percent increase in the money supply in  1695 as 
coinage of gold guineas increased. 
Finally, in December,  1695, the government took action. It demo- 
netized all clipped and worn  silver coins as of February  1696, after 
which the Mint would accept them by weight only. The recall of the 
silver coinage to the Mint in 1696, without provision for prompt reissue 
of coin of standard weight and fineness, led to an abrupt reduction in 
the money supply in the first half of  1696. This effect was offset to 
some extent by the dishoarding of standard weight coins and by note 
issues of the Bank of England which suspended specie payments; money 
substitutes, for which there are no estimates, were also pressed into 
use. The monthly price data, in any event, declined at a  12 percent 
annual rate in the first half of  1696, reflecting not only the contraction 
in the money supply but also the unloading of stocks of commodities 
accumulated earlier. Thereafter, as the new coinage was disbursed by 
the Mint, the money supply grew slowly, reaching the same level in 
mid-1698 as in mid-1694. Since the monthly price data end in April 
1697, we cannot trace the price change for the parallel period,  but 
prices are rising at the time the series ends (Horsefield 1960; Letwin 
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The French price series, which ends in 1700, follows a roughly similar 
course to that of the English series. One exception occurred in the 
eighteenth century, during the years  1716-20,  when John Law’s ex- 
periment with banknote issues slightly more than doubled the volume 
of French currency. Commodity prices exhibited a similar rise, though 
money wages rose only 60 percent. This episode may be observed in 
the monthly data for Paris, but not for London, Madrid, or  Philadelphia 
(Hamilton 1936b, pp. 62-70).  Wholesale prices in the American Col- 
onies apparently increased from 1726-50 to 1751 -75  at an annual rate 
of 1.2 percent per year. 
For the European countries, rates of change in money wages are 
shown for available dates and matching price changes are given (table 
3.4). Money wages sometimes rose faster than prices, sometimes slower. 
Depending on the initial and terminal dates chosen, the pattern shifts, 
but in general the wage data show movements paralleling commodity 
prices. The trend of the spotty interest rate data in the seventeenth 
century is downward. Beginning 1727 yields on long-term British gov- 
ernment securities are available. They are remarkably similar in move- 
ment to British commodity price changes (Homer 1963, pp. 161-62). 
Our statistical information regarding the monetary experience of the 
American colonies is sketchy, so it is difficult to determine the extent 
to which it conforms  to the money-output-price  relationship I have 
been describing. From  1720 to 1774, discontinuous annual estimates 
of the outstanding value of bills of public credit and Treasury notes 
are available with better coverage for five of  the colonies than for seven 
others. Matching price data for each colony are unavailable. Exchange 
rates on London are, however, known for each of the five colonies. 
The depreciation of exchange rates varied from  12 to 13  percent  in 
New York and in Virginia, to 27 percent in Pennsylvania, 330 percent 
in Boston, and 1340 percent in Rhode Island. The outstanding value 
of bills of public credit issued does not closely match exchange rate 
movements, although in general the New England colonies issued far 
more than did the Middle Atlantic colonies and Virginia. However, 
bills of credit were oniy one form of paper money then in use. Estimates 
of loan bank issues and of private bills of exchange plus such specie 
as there was would need to be included to form some judgment of how 
serious the disparity is between total nominal money issues and the 
real values of those issues expressed as sterling at current exchange 
rates (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960; Weiss 1970). 
Since the focus here is secular price change, I omit discussion of the 
two short-term episodes at the conclusion of this subperiod: the 84 
percent per month average rate of rise in prices during the American 
Revolution, ending in the discontinuation in use of  continental cur- 
rency; and the 10  percent per month average rate of rise in prices in 
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use of assignats (Bezanson 1951, pp.  93, 343; Harris  1930, pp.  106, 
108). 
One important change in the eighteenth century was the proliferation 
of forms in which money was held and used. In England, silver and 
gold coin were supplemented by note issues of the Bank of England, 
London private banks, and, after 1750, country banks, as well as by 
inland bills of exchange created by individual borrowers or lenders. In 
Holland, where the Bank of Amsterdam was founded at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century, paper money became well known. In Spain, 
its use became familiar in the last quarter of  the eighteenth century. 
In France, lingering distrust created by John Law’s ill-fated banknote 
issues effectively ended further public willingness to hold money in 
any form but coin until the Revolution. 
The eighteenth century was punctuated by brief periods of  peace 
between prolonged wars involving at one time or another all the leading 
countries. Though wars in modern experience are associated with price 
increases as monetary authorities finance government expenditures to 
prosecute their military involvements, in the eighteenth century before 
the Napoleonic Wars no consistent relationship between wars and prices 
is observed. The Bank of  England, for example, curtailed loans on 
private account when it increased them on government account (Ashton 
1959, p. 65). In Spain, outflows of specie and blockades against imports 
from Spanish America occurred during wartime, and except when pa- 
per money issues were introduced, prices did not rise. During peace- 
time, inflows of specie and paper money issues matched periods of 
price rise (Hamilton 1947, p. 217). 
For the eighteenth century, as for the Price Revolution, European 
population change has been invoked by some economic historians as 
the causal factor producing the rough stability of prices until the middle 
of the century, and the rise thereafter, with differential effects on ag- 
ricultural and industrial prices. Change in rate of population growth, 
however, is not consistently related to change in secular price move- 
ments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,  the final historical 
evidence that I want to consider (Grauman 1968, pp. 378-79). 
3.4  From the Napoleonic Wars to the Twentieth Century 
Table 3.5 shows annual average rates of price change for the series 
available for selected countries for each of six secular episodes in the 
period from 1790 to the early  1930s. Wage and interest rate data are 
included where possible. Three periods of secular price rise alternate 
with three periods of secular price decline. 
In the extensive literature devoted to these episodes, four main ex- 
planations have been advanced: explanations stressing (1) monetary 
factors, (2) cost-push and cost-pull factors, (3) a long-wave mechanism, lsble 3.5 
Episode:  1.  Inflation  2.  Deflation  3.  Inflation  4. Deflation  5.  Inflation  6.  Deflation 
General 
Six  Episodes of Secular Price Change, Four Countries, 1790-1934 
Chronology:  1790-1815  1815-50  1850- 73  1873-96  18%-1920  1920-34 
Annual Average Rate of Change 
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-  3.9 
-  2.2 
-  0.09 
-  1.2 
-0.3 
-0.27 
-  8.4 
-  0.25 Note: Rates of change are from initial to terminal values assuming continuous compounding. 
Sources: 
Great Britain--Prices:  1790- 1813; 1813-50  (Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz index of domestic and imported com- 
modities, from Mitchell and Deane 1%2,  p. 470);  1873-96;  1896-1920;  1920-34  (through 1913, an approximation 
of retail prices, furnished by Phyllis Deane; thereafter,  1914- 18,  Ministry of Labour cost-of-living index; 1919-34, 
Ministry of Labour  retail price index). Wages: 1790-1810;  1810-45  (from Mitchell and Deane 1%2,  p. 343, Part A, 
Great Britain);  1850-74  (ibid., Part B);  1874-95;  1895-1920;  1920-34  (wage rates from Phelps Brown and Sheila 
Hopkins,  1950,  pp. 276,  281-1914-20  shifted to level of  1895-1914).  Interest rates:  1792-1812;  1812-52;  1852- 
74;  1874-97;  1897-1920;  1920-35  (yield on  Consols, from Homer 1963, pp.  162,  195-197,  409). 
United Stares-Prices:  1791-1814;  1814-49;  1849-65  (from Warren and Pearson 1932, pp. 8-9);  1869-96;  18%- 
1920;  1920-33  (price deflator implicit in unpublished  annual net  national product estimates of Robert Gallman, 
1869-1909,  thereafter ot Simon Kuznets). Wages: 1869-95;  1895-1920;  1920-33  (wage rates, from Phelps Brown 
and Sheila Hopkins, 1950, pp. 277,  282-1914-20  shifted to level of  1895-1914).  Interest rates: 1869-99;  1899- 
1921; 1921-34  (through 1899, railroad bond yields, adjusted to level of following segment, which is the basic yield 
on  30-year corporate bonds, from Homer 1963, pp. 310,  316,  374). 
Germany-Prices:  1792-94  to 1807-09;  1807-09 to 1848-50 (wholesale prices from Jacobs and Richter 1935, pp. 
82-83);  1850-74;  1874-95  (price deflator implicit in net national product, from Hoffmann 1965, pp. 825-828);  1896- 
1920; 1924-31 (cost-of-living index, from Bry 1960, pp. 325-327).  Wages: 1873 to 1894-95;  1925-33  (Phelps Brown 
and Margaret Browne 1968, pp. 436-438).  Interest rates:  1818-52,  1852-73;  1873-96;  1896-1924;  1924-33  (yield 
on  Prussian State 4s or 3%;  Bavarian 31/zs;  computed average of bond yields; high-grade bond yields, from Homer 
France--Prices:  1820-51;  1851-73;  1873-96;  1896-1920;  1926-34  (wholesale prices,  from Jacobs and Richter 
1935,  pp.  34-35).  Interest rates:  1816-52;  1853-73;  1873-97;  1897-1920;  1925-34  (yield on 5%  or 3%  French 
government rentes, from Homer 1%3,  pp. 222-223,  426-427). 
1963,  pp. 259-260,  260-261,461). %  Anna J. Schwartz 
and (4)  rates of economic growth. I shall summarize each approach 
and then discuss objections raised against each. 
1. In each pair of episodes the monetary explanation notes the fol- 
lowing factors: 
a. Wartime expansion of note issues in England, especially after the 
Bank  of  England  suspended  specie payments  in  1797, followed by 
contraction of paper money issues, especially after England resolved 
to return to the gold standard at the prewar parity in 1821. The return 
to gold was coupled with a decline in the output of precious metals in 
Latin America; and accompanied by growth in output and population. 
b.  Gold discoveries in the United States and Australia,  1848-51, 
increased world gold output over the following decade and a half at an 
annual rate of 8 percent. The gold producing countries distributed the 
output among their trading partners, thus leading to faster monetary 
growth in those countries. Monetary expansion was greatly increased 
in the United States during the Civil War when specie payments were 
suspended, and in France and Germany during the Franco-Prussian 
War. This episode was succeeded by a  1 percent per year decline in 
the rate of growth of world gold output, 1873-87,  at a time when the 
gold standard  was adopted  by  several countries,  the United  States 
resumed specie payments, and silver was demonetized. An expansion 
of world gold output during the following decade was accompanied by 
rapid growth in population and output (Warren 1933, p. 97). 
c. An increase of about 4.5 percent per year in world gold output, 
1896- 1914, permitted faster growth of money supply. To finance World 
War I, the belligerent countries stepped up monetary growth further. 
Prices collapsed  in  1920  or 1921  as extraordinary  wartime  rates of 
growth of money ceased, except in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Po- 
land,  and Russia,  where hyperinflations  intervened.  Thereafter, the 
progressive  contraction of the U.S.  money supply, 1929-32,  and the 
collapse of the U.S. banking system produced a sharp price decline. 
The U.S.  contraction ensured a worldwide decline in prices because 
of the links forged by fixed rates of exchange under the gold exchange 
standard to which most countries adhered in  1929. 
2. The cost-push or cost-pull explanation stresses demand and supply 
conditions in individual markets.  Rises in costs are associated with 
poor harvests, obstructions in supply conditions-including  wartime 
blockades-increases  in foreign exchange, insurance, freight, and in- 
terest costs. Declines in costs are associated with good harvests, im- 
proved transportation  facilities, discovery of new foreign sources of 
supply, technological improvements, and reduced foreign exchange, 
insurance, and interest costs. 
The cost-push explanation was advanced with special emphasis on 
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at the December 1910 annual meeting of the American Economic As- 
sociation. J. Laurence Laughlin argued that since the increase in the 
supply of gold had just been offset by the increase in demand for gold, 
and since the supply of credit was determined by the demand, factors 
other than an increase in money supply must have been responsible 
for the price rise. The factors he cited included the Dingley Tariff of 
1897, higher tax rates, agricultural conditions, speculation, general ex- 
travagance-“new  wealth makes a liberal spender” (Laughlin 191  1, p. 
36)-and,  finally, two factors with a very modern ring: wages and union- 
ism, and monopolies and trusts. A year and a half earlier, in the Journal 
of  Political Economy, Laughlin had argued that “the pressure of labor 
unions”  had been “an influence independent of prices”  which acted 
to raise the rate of wages, and that once a high rate of wages had been 
granted, it was not easy for employers to force a reduction. His proof 
was “the after-effects of the recent panic of 1907” (Laughlin 1909, pp. 
267, 269). As for monopolies and trusts, Laughlin stated, “As  every 
economist knows, in the conditions under which many industries are 
today  organized, expenses of  production  have no direct relation  to 
prices. In such conditions, there is a field in which the policy of charging 
‘what the traffic will bear’ prevails; and this includes industries that 
are not public utilities” (Laughlin 1911, p. 35). (A companion paper at 
this session was delivered by Irving Fisher, who responded gallantly, 
“I find myself unable to agree with most of  the positions  taken by 
Professor Laughlin in his able paper.”)4 
3. The long-wave explanation, in Schumpeter’s version, stresses the 
role of new techniques, as, for example, in the manufacture of textiles 
and iron in the Industrial Revolution of the first pair of episodes, the 
introduction of railways in the second pair, and innovations utilizing 
electric power and chemistry in the third pair. Prices rise in the upward 
phase of a long wave, corresponding to the introduction of innovations 
by pioneering entrepreneurs, because credit is expanded and the de- 
mand for goods increases while the output of the innovations is not 
yet fully realized. Prices fall during the downward phase of a long wave, 
corresponding to the period when hordes of followers imitate the in- 
novators, and the cost-reducing effects of the innovations are realized 
in increased output. Profits and interest rates are high during the upward 
phase and low during the downward phase. Since variation in the output 
of  commodities is determined  by  the long-wave process,  unless  the 
behavior of the money supply were exactly compensatory, price move- 
ments are generally determined  by  output movements  (Schumpeter 
1939). 
4.  The explanation stressing economic  growth  compares rates of 
growth of world industrial capacity and the output of primary products 
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primary products, the prices of primary products rise absolutely and 
relatively to industrial wages. The rise in wholesale prices of raw ma- 
terials raises prices  “fixed”  for final products,  which induces wage 
earners to press for rises in money wages. Other incomes rise in turn, 
causing further rises in costs and prices. The risk of raising prices is 
smaller for sellers at such a time when competitors are also raising 
their prices and customers’ expectations of price increases justify them. 
It is granted that monetary restriction could stop prices from rising, 
but in fact, it is asserted, in the past, monetary restriction has taken 
place only enough to raise the long-term rate of interest gradually as 
the upward price trend has gone on. All these reactions to a rise in 
wholesale prices are in the reverse directions when wholesale prices 
fall. Long-period price declines have not been due to shortage of money, 
it is asserted, although presumably  monetary expansion could  stop 
prices from falling (Brown and Ozga 1955). 
Let me now examine in turn the objections that have been raised 
against each of these explanations. Three have been raised against the 
monetary explanation. 
1. One objection to the monetary explanation was based on erroneous 
British money supply statistics, particularly from about 1875 to 1913, 
which purported  to show a relatively constant rate of growth of the 
series, unaffected by variations in gold production. Improved statistics 
indicate that the growth rate of the British money supply was decidedly 
lower from 1873 to 1895 than from 1851 to 1873 and from 1895 to 1913, 
and the same seems to be true of money growth rates of other countries 
with defective banking statistics (Higonnet 1957, pp. 350-354). 
2. Another objection judged the fall in interest rates during periods 
of  secular price decline to be an embarrassment to the monetary ex- 
planation, implying that no distinction need be made between nominal 
and real interest rates. Once the distinction is made, however, declining 
interest rates can be interpreted  as a reflection of  declining prices. 
Insofar as changes in the purchasing power of money are anticipated, 
bond  prices will  tend to be higher and nominal yields lower when 
commodity prices are falling than when they are rising, the increase in 
the real value of the principal constituting a return in addition to the 
nominal interest paid. Since anticipations usually lag the actual fall in 
prices, interest rates will usually fall together with commodity prices 
as they adjust to the price fall. The Gibson Paradox, in  short, is an 
implication of rather than an embarrassment to the monetary expla- 
nation of secular price movements. 
It has been suggested that the paradox disappears if the assumption 
is made that movements in the price level are inversely related to the 
change in money supply. A rise in prices would imply “(other things 
being equal) an extension of the demand for monetary balances, and 99  Secular Price Change in Historical Perspective 
higher rates of interest” (Brown and Browne 1968, p.  108); a decline 
in prices would imply a contraction of the demand for monetary bal- 
ances, and a lower rate of interest. In my view, the willingness to “allow 
the possibility that the rise of the price level may come about without 
an antecedent increase in the stock of money”  reflects both error re- 
garding the movements of the money  stock and commitment to the 
belief that changes in money supply influence interest rates only, and 
that the channel of influence is only through a negative liquidity effect. 
3. A final objection is that the monetary explanation cannot incor- 
porate cost changes. The argument is essentially a statement of the 
view that prices rise when money costs rise and prices fall when money 
costs fall. Thus, this objection to the monetary explanation ties in with 
the cost approach to secular price change, so I shall discuss it in the 
more general context of that view. 
The monetary explanation, it must be said at the outset, incorporates 
all supply influences in the output variable to which the growth in the 
money supply is related. The effects of reduced real costs are allowed 
for in the monetary explanation in the increase in output which cost 
reduction has achieved, or in the decrease in output which real cost 
increases entail, under given demand conditions. 
What the cost explanation, on the other hand, fails to show is, first, 
where the autonomous increase in cost comes from. Fundamentally, 
it begs the question. Of course, if  costs rise more than productivity, 
so will prices in general. But what produces the rise in cost? Here the 
explanation is generally ad hoc, relying on different factors in different 
 circumstance^,^ and typically confusing effects on relative costs with 
effects on absolute costs. Moreover, even if this basic defect is over- 
looked, and we suppose an autonomous rise in nominal costs, the cost 
explanation must then show how the increase in money costs increased 
either money supply or velocity or both or how a decrease in money 
costs decreased either money supply or velocity or both. It has failed 
to do so. With respect to the relationship between costs and money 
supply we can set aside the political  argument that is advanced in 
respect of post-World  War I1 conditions, namely, that the existence of 
a full-employment policy enforces growth in the money supply to Val- 
idate cost increases that would otherwise lead to unemployment. This 
political argument obviously has no relevance to the world of the nine- 
teenth and first third of the twentieth century. An alternative argument 
to the effect that changing costs affected the demand for working cap- 
ital, on the surface, seems more plausible. It implies that demand for 
bank loans determined the rate of growth of money. 
On this issue, we have some evidence in Cagan’s study of the U.S. 
money supply. If  banks were the channel through which secular changes 
in the rate of growth of the money supply were produced, we should 100  Anna J. Schwartz 
expect to find the usable reserve ratio-Cagan’s  term for total minus 
required reserve ratio-rising  during secular periods of price decline, 
when presumably the demand for bank loans would have been weak, 
and declining during secular periods of price rise, when presumably 
the demand for bank loans would have been strong. We do not observe 
such movements in the data. The usable reserve ratio declined during 
the period of secular price decline to 1895, declined further during the 
following period of secular price rise to 1920, and during the succeeding 
period of price decline also declined through 1929. So the U.S. reserve 
ratio gives no confirmation to the argument  that demand for loans 
determined the money supply. More basically, Cagan has shown that 
the major source of secular changes in the U.S. money supply has been 
changes in high-powered money, not changes in the reserve ratio (Ca- 
gan 1965, pp. 280-286). 
It has been asserted that there need be no “preliminary permissive 
or causal movement on the side of money” (Brown and Browne 1968, 
p. 156) for the general level of prices to change. “The general level of 
prices can rise . . . if particular price rises originating in the balance 
of supply and demand for particular products or factors of production 
are passed on, and compensated, by rises of other prices and money 
incomes. Recent  years of full employment  have shown how a tacit 
conspiracy to do this can be formed and perpetuate itself when once 
each man who takes part in it comes to believe that the others are in 
it too”  (Brown and Browne  1968, p.  108). This is a modern example 
of the confusion between relative and absolute costs discussed earlier. 
However, the modern version of the fallacy is buttressed by a more 
sophisticated argument, namely, that with  no change in  the money 
stock, a rise in costs or prices will force interest rates up, since the 
demand for nominal money rises; the rise in interest rates will then 
push up velocity; a decline in costs or prices will pull interest rates 
down, since the demand for nominal money falls; the decline in interest 
rates will then pull down velocity. But this raises two problems: first, 
the standard problem of what causes absolute costs to rise or fall; and, 
second, how this effect, even if it occurred, could be more than a once- 
for-all effect. For inflation to continue, velocity must continue to rise. 
As already stated, the monetary explanation implies such a pattern, 
following an increase in the rate of monetary growth, because of the 
effect of inflation on nominal interest rates. However, the cost-inflation 
explanation must produce the result with no change in the money stock. 
On the cost-inflation view, there is no reason why price rises and falls 
should be correlated at all with rates of monetary growth; they should 
rather be correlated with velocity. In fact, the correlations are decidedly 
higher with rates of  monetary growth per unit  of  output than with 
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and  rate  of  price  change, while  it  can be  detected  in  the data by 
sophisticated  statistical  analysis,  is  generally  hidden  to  the  naked 
eye. For example, velocity declined in the United States during both 
secular price declines and secular price rises in the period from 1869 
to  1932. Finally,  secular velocity  changes, at least through  1929 in 
the United States, did not parallel closely similar swings in interest 
rates. 
The cost-push cost-pull argument amounts to an assertion that there 
is no common element affecting the price level. The price level is only 
the collection of prices determined in individual markets. A rise in an 
individual price has  an inflationary effect, with  no force producing 
offsetting changes if one relative prices increases. Relative price changes 
accordingly are identical with price level changes. 
No better response to this approach can be cited than one Irving 
Fisher gave sixty years ago (Fisher 1911a): 
The legitimacy of separating the study of price levels from that of 
[individual] prices will be clearly recognized, when it is seen that 
individual prices cannot be fully determined by supply and demand, 
money cost of production, etc., without surreptitiously introducing 
the price level itself. We  can scarcely overemphasize the fact that 
the “supply and demand” or the “cost of production”  of goods in 
terms of money do not and cannot completely determine prices. Each 
phrase, fully expressed, already implies money. There is always hid- 
den somewhere the assumption of a general price level. 
. . . In elementary textbooks much emphasis is laid on the fact that 
“demand”  and “supply”  are incomplete designations and to give 
them meaning it is necessary to add to each the phrase “at a price.” 
But emphasis also needs to be laid on the fact that “demand  at a 
price” and “supply at a price” are still incomplete designations, and 
that to give them meaning it is necessary to add “at a price level.” 
The demand for sugar is not only relative to the price of sugar, but 
also to the general level of other things. . . . The price of sugar in 
dollars depends partly on sugar and partly on dollars, that is, on 
what dollars will buy-that  is, on the price level. . . .  We  have more 
need to study the price level preparatory to a study of the price of 
sugar than to study the price of sugar preparatory to a study of the 
price level. 
. . . The terms “demand”  and “supply,”  used in reference to par- 
ticular prices, have no significance whatever in explaining a rise or 
fall of price levels. In considering the influence affecting individual 
prices we say that an increase in supply lowers prices, but an  increase 
in demand raises them.  But in considering the influences affecting 
price levels we enter upon an entirely different set of concepts, and 
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to lower the price  level,  with  the proposition that an increase in 
supply tends to lower an individual price. 
I now turn to the Schumpeter long-wave interpretation of secular 
price changes. This is not the occasion to review the detailed challenges 
to the validity of the whole long-wave conception, so I shall limit myself 
to two comments. Long-run price behavior of individual commodities 
and services may be adequately explained by an innovation process 
such as Schumpeter describes, but it is hard to believe that the impact 
of innovation limited to a few pioneering entrepreneurs can be as de- 
cisive a factor for the economy as a whole as Schumpeter’s thesis 
requires in the long-wave upswing. It is also hard to believe that pi- 
oneering entrepreneurs would emerge in all Western countries at ap- 
proximately  the same time.  This is not to deny that the long-wave 
conception may have some merit in ascribing increased output in the 
downswing to the widespread adoption of new techniques, but at best 
the explanation is incomplete and partial. 
More important, this explanation would call for change in the rate 
of monetary  growth of  a smaller order of  magnitude than of  either 
changes in the rates of price rise and output growth. But the facts are 
the other way around. Variability in monetary growth is of  far larger 
order of magnitude than variability in rates of price rise and output 
growth .‘j 
Finally, with respect to the hypothesis that secular price changes came 
about through disparities between the world growth rates of  industrial 
capacity and output of primary products, the only evidence presented 
in support of the conception is a chart for 1872-1951  of a world (less 
Russia) pig iron output-to  indicate industrial capacity-xpressed  as 
a ratio to an index of world output of eight primary products. Although 
the results are described as “not inconsistent with our account of the 
origin of the wholesale price level” (Brown and Ozga 1955, p. 13), I do 
not observe a downward trend that is supposed to characterize the pe- 
riod 1872-94,  one of three subperiods the chart is supposed to substan- 
tiate (data for the years 1946-51  can hardly be considered a fourth sec- 
ular subperiod). At a minimum, parallel data on prices and output for 
industrial and primary products would be required, and some evidence 
as well on  leads and lags to give substance to the hypothesis. Even so, 
it would still be necessary to show that the assumptions the hypothesis 
makes relating to monetary behavior are valid. 
There are no doubt models other than those I have discussed in the 
literature on secular price movements of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, but I hope I have said enough to indicate the variety that 
exists.  It is time now to state the conclusions that I draw from the 
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3.5  Conclusions from the Historical Evidence 
I draw ten conclusions from the historical record: 
1. Episodes of rising prices have alternated with episodes of declining 
prices, apparently for as long as money has been used as a medium of 
exchange. 
2. Until the eighteenth century, the sources of monetary expansion 
and contraction were the output of precious metals and debasement or 
restoration of the coinage. These sources have since been supplemented 
or supplanted by paper money issues of banknotes or deposit currency. 
All forms of money issue have been subject to governmental control. 
3. Before the era of twentieth-century central banking, governments 
tended to be passive in relation to long-term changes in world precious 
metal output and the changing rate of accrual to their national stocks. 
In earlier centuries, debasements and restorations of coinage seem to 
have been determined mainly by fiscal needs, although this does not 
explain why the Greek practice was so different in this respect from 
that of the Romans, or why England engaged in little debasement in 
the fourteenth century while France engaged in much, and in a follow- 
ing century why England debased and France did not. On some oc- 
casions such measures may have offset the retardation or acceleration 
of the growth of precious metals, but there are only limited data to 
confirm this suggestion. Since the eighteenth century, deliberate large- 
scale increases in paper money issues have usually been  associated 
with war financing, but John Law’s experiment is an exception. Delib- 
erate contraction of paper money issues has been associated with post- 
war return to the gold standard at a prewar parity, or a decision to call 
a halt to a postwar inflation, as in the United States in 1920. 
4. Long-run price changes consistently parallel the monetary changes, 
with one exception for England in the sixteenth century. 
5. With the exception of  war and immediate postwar periods;  in 
earlier centuries, plagues; and the economic disaster of 1929-32, output 
has apparently grown during both periods of secular price rise and fall. 
6. Discrepancies between movements of the ratio of the money stock 
to real output and price movements reflect long-run changes in the 
public’s demand for money balances.  U.S.  and British data suggest 
that the long-run movement until World War I1 trended upward. Such 
a trend would accentuate price declines and moderate prices rises. 
7. In recent centuries, the price episodes occurred at approximately 
the same dates in numerous countries. The mechanism for the diffusion 
of an episode was the mutual adjustment of price levels between coun- 
tries by international trade and the redistribution of the world stock of 
monetary reserves.  This was the case under both the gold standard 
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pendent  variable, which had to adjust to produce  a level of  prices 
relative to prices abroad consistent with balance of payments equilib- 
rium, and in the period after the war, when monetary authorities had 
more leeway with respect to control of the quantity of money. In both 
cases, a change in the quantity of money was the mechanism whereby 
prices in one country were kept in line with prices abroad. Changes in 
the quantity of money in any one country were produced by changes 
in that country’s prices relative to foreign prices. Changes in the quan- 
tity of money then produced changes in the country’s absolute price 
level. 
8. Over the centuries it has been alleged that factors other than the 
ratio of money stock to output have caused secular price movements. 
These factors have ranged from changing population growth to changes 
in costs of production to the presence or absence of  speculation. If 
each price episode were a response to a constellation of factors other 
than money, it would then be necessary to show how that constellation 
produced either a change in money stock or in velocity associated with 
an individual price episode. No one has done so. 
9.  Costs of production are prices that are subject to change by the 
same monetary influences as are prices of final goods. Prices of factors 
that did not change in unison with commodity prices would indicate a 
defect in the market for labor or capital, lack of foresight that would 
lead to an effective wage below the marginal product of labor, or too 
low an interest rate to leave borrower-lender relations unaffected when 
prices are rising and the opposite when prices are falling. The existence 
of  a temporary  lag is conceivable in cases where arrangements are 
contractual or customary, but contracts were renegotiated and custom 
changed, so presumably prices of factors eventually responded. The 
rise in wages and interest rates during price upswings and their fall 
during price downswings were not the causes of the price movements 
but reflections of the same forces that produced the price movements. 
Particularly with respect to secular price movements from the six- 
teenth to the twentieth centuries, the literature of economics contains 
many analyses contending that wages lagged behind prices,  swelling 
business profits during inflations and inflicting business losses during 
periods of declining prices. As Kessel and Alchian (1960) have shown, 
this is an untested hypothesis. If it were true, it would be difficult to 
reconcile with the cost-push, cost-pull hypothesis. 
Were there autonomous forces raising wages and prices? Increasingly 
strong unions and increasingly  strong monopolies in the process  of 
raising their wages and prices to levels consistent with  their newly 
acquired monopoly power can push their relative wages and prices up, 
and if there is a lag in the adjustment of other absolute prices, for a 
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etary stimulus-though  not without unemployment. The attribution in 
1909 of the U.S. price rise after 1897 to the effect of unions and trusts 
suggests that the pre-World  War I economy was viewed by some con- 
temporaries in much the same light as the post-World  War I1 economy 
is viewed by some contemporaries now. The difficulty posed by this 
explanation is that, if  used to account for the secular price rise,  it 
cannot then account for the sharp reversal in the price movement in 
1920. Union membership constituted 3.5 percent of all nonagricultural 
employees in  1897, 9.9 percent in  1909 (when Laughlin wrote), and 
peaked at 19.6 percent in 1921, a year after the wholesale price index 
had declined 37 percent and the consumer price index had declined 11 
percent  (Troy  1965, p. 2). Similarly, monopoly power was evidently 
growing during the first decade of the century; no data suggest that it 
subsequently  disintegrated.  The  absurd  conclusion  the explanation 
compels is that strong unions and monopolies chose to lower wages 
and prices drastically in 1920. 
10. The role of price expectations as an autonomous factor lowering 
or raising interest rates, reducing or adding to wage demands in past 
secular price movements, is difficult to establish. However, some pre- 
liminary results of a study of monetary trends that Professor Friedman 
and I have been engaged in suggest that in the form in which we express 
our variables, past price change is a good index of expectations about 
current price behavior. The higher the index, the larger the fraction of 
current monetary expansion that is absorbed by prices. Similarly, we 
find that over periods longer than a cycle, a higher rate of monetary 
change is associated with a higher level of nominal interest rates. This 
relationship is a reflection of a relationship between price expectations 
and the level of interest rates. 
Having completed this summary of what I believe the historical re- 
cord teaches us, I want finally to give some indication that the lessons 
of the past are not irrelevant to the present. Rates of  change in money 
stock (currency plus demand deposits), per unit of output, and rates 
of change in prices  in forty countries  over the period  1952-69  are 
plotted as a scatter diagram in figure 3.1.* Each dot plots the rate of 
change in prices over the 17-year period against the rate of change in 
the quantity of money per unit of output over the same period. There 
are 40 dots for 40 countries. The diagonal lines across the chart is the 
line on which a 12 percent  change in prices is associated with a  12 
percent change in the quantity of money, a 10 percent change in one 
with a 10 percent change in the other, and so on. The points are closely 
scattered along such a diagonal line. At the top of the chart are the 
countries that have had about a 30 percent increase in the quantity of 
money per unit of output and they have had about a 30 percent change 
in prices. At the bottom are the countries that have had a small rate 106  Anna J. Schwartz 
Change in prices 
(percent per year) 
Change in MI  per  unit  of  output  (percent  per year) 
Rate of change in prices and in MI  per unit of  output forty 
countries, 1952-69. 
Figure 3.1 
of change in money per unit of output and a small rate of  change in 
prices. In the post-World  War I1 world, there has been an extremely 
close long-term relationship between the rate of change in prices and 
in money per unit of output. Adjusted R* is .942. The scatter suggests 
to me that the key to understanding secular price change now as in the 
past is the behavior of money stock per unit of  output. A fitting con- 
clusion to this look backward, I therefore believe, is George Santay- 
ana’s remark, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned 
to repeat it.” 
Notes 
1. If  the income elasticity of the demand for money is greater than unity, 
obviously there will be no perfect one-to-one correspondence between changes 107  Secular Price Change in Historical Perspective 
in the ratio of money to output and prices. I regard Paul Trescott’s comments 
on this score as a refinement of, rather than a challenge to, the broad-brush 
picture I have drawn. The first-order effect I have examined seems to me to 
have high explanatory power. Trescott’s comment introduces a second-order 
effect. A similar statement applies to his reference to the presence of a lagged 
influence of money on prices, which I in no way dispute. 
2.  Judged by modern monetary experience, these growth rates of the gold 
and silver stock are modest. For example, the U.S. money supply multiplied 
157-fold in the period  1867-1960  or at an annual rate of 5.4 percent. Debase- 
ment,  of course, and later,  paper money  issues permitted  faster growth of 
national money stocks than of their metallic constituent.  The estimates of the 
English money stock in 1562 (table ? above) and 1697 (see n. 3, below) indicate 
that during the period it multiplied 15.5-fold or at an annual rate of 2 percent. 
Prices rose .8 percent per year over the comparable period. After allowance 
for the rate of price rise, in the absence of the underlying estimates, we cannot 
say how the annual rate of monetary growth was divided among the rate of 
population growth, per capita output, and the growth in per capita holdings of 
money. 
3. I find less of a problem with this episode than does Horsefield, the author 
of  the money  supply estimates. He distorted the relationship  between the 
money and price figures because of  the way he chose to summarize them. 
His half-yearly estimates of the volume of coin and bank notes in circulation 
are for end of June and end of December. The price indexes are for the first 
week of each month. In my comments, I compared the movements from, say, 
end of  June to end of December in the money estimates  and from the first 
week in July to the first week in January prices.  Horsefield  averaged June 
and December, December and June of the money estimates, and related the 
percentage  change  from  the first  to the  second  average to the percentage 
change in the six-month averages of the price data. As a result, for example, 
a decline of 36 percent  in his original December  1695 to June 16%  money 
estimates and a rise of 9 percent from June 1696 to December  1696 appear 
as a decline of  16 percent in the first half of 1696 and a decline of  19 percent 
in the second half of 16%. 
Money Supply Estimatesa 
Col. 1 as 
Averaged by  % Change  Horsefield’s Date 
Year  End of Month  fm.  % Change  Horsefield  Col. 3  for Col. 4 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1695  June  25.3 
25.9 
21.7  -  16  Jan.-June,  1696 
17.7  -  19  July-Dec.,  16% 
19.5  10  Jan.-June,  1697 
Dec.  26.5  19 
16%  June  16.9  -36 
Dec.  18.5  9 
June  20.5  11 
OHorsefield (1%0),  p. 14. 108  Anna J. Schwartz 
Index of  Nonagricultural Pricesb 
% Change  Six Month 
First Week  at Annual  Averages 
of Month  1695  = 100  Rate, Col. 1  Period  Level  % Change 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1695  July  98.3  July-Dec.  97.1 
1696  Jan.  109.6  23  Jan.-June  103.2  7 
1697  Jan.  105.0  4  Jan.-June  102.4  -7 
July  102.7  -  12  July-Dec.  110.4  7 
bHorsefield (1960), pp. 18, 252. Underlying data from A Collection for Improvement of 
Husbandry and Trade, edited by John Hougton, 1692-1702. 
The failure of the money supply changes so derived to match the price changes 
led Horsefield to invoke changes in velocity as a factor that must have been 
important. Without denying that velocity changes may well have played a role, 
I believe that Horsefield would have had less difficulty in analyzing the episode 
had he used his estimates directly. Ashton (1960) observed that the decline in 
the money supply in Horsefield’s estimate for June 1696 is exaggerated because 
of his failure to take account of sound silver coin that returned to circulation 
that year when only standard weight coins became acceptable. Letwin (1964) 
prepared alternative Dec. 31 estimates of the money supply, 1694-98,  that he 
regarded as consistent with the price movements of those years. 
I am indebted  to Martin Bronfenbrenner for suggesting that comment be 
included in this paper on the 1696 English recoinage as well as on American 
colonial monetary experience, which is discussed in the text. 
4. Irving Fisher’s paper was based on chapter 12 of The Purchasing Power 
of Money, a forthcoming publication at the time of the AEA meeting (Fisher 
1911b). He concluded  that the increase in M, which  was due in turn to an 
increase in gold production, was the chief cause of the rise in prices, 1896- 
1909. The increase in  V’  was next in importance to the increase in M as a 
cause of the rise in prices. He attributed the rise in V’  to the concentration of 
population  in  cities.  Almost  equal in importance to the rise in  V‘  was the 
increase in the ratio of M’ to M,  which Fisher attributed to the “opening  up 
of the South” and the change in the banking law favoring small banks (Fisher 
191 la, pp. 44-45). 
5. Lance Davis’ comments constitute a rejection  of the approach of  this 
paper. I leave it to the reader to decide whether a common explanation of the 
episodes in terms of the change in money stock per unit of output or an ad 
hoc explanation of each episode has greater intellectual appeal. 
6. This finding is drawn from a study of monetary trends in the United States 
and the United Kingdom since 1880 (see Friedman and Schwartz 1963a). 
7.  The widespread belief in the historical law of  rising prices is apparently 
based on five major inflations in the past seven centuries: (1) the Price Rev- 
olution of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; (2) the inflation in the 
half century before the Napoleonic Wars; inflations during (3) the Napoleonic 
Wars; (4) World War I; and (5) World War 11. Only the first two inflations and 
the last one permanently  shifted the price level upward. If these are excluded 
from the historical record, a bet on a rise in prices ten years hence starting 
every year beginning 1275 would be wrong more times than it would be right. 
It may, of course, be the case that the world has changed since World War 11, 
so that in every year since a bet on a rise in the price level over a ten-year 109  Secular Price Change in Historical Perspective 
span would  be right,  but then the argument  would  be  that rather than an 
extrapolation from the past, future price experience will differ from the long 
historical record. For  an illuminating discussion of the evidence, see Lipsey 
(1 960a). 
8. James Lothian kindly provided me with a printout of annual data for the 
forty countries through 1%6, and I updated the figures to 1969, except for two 
countries (Brazil and the Dominican Republic) for which the period ends in 
1968 and three (Iceland, Peru, and Uruguay) for which the period ends in 1967. 
The money  and price  figures  come from  International  Financial  Statistics 
Supplement, 1971. Money is defined as currency plus demand deposits held 
by the public.  Prices are cost-of-living indexes on a 1963 base. Income data 
are from U.N.,  Yearbook ofNationa1 Account Statistics, 1970, table 179, and 
U.N., Monthly Bulletin ofstatistics, Oct. 1971, table 61, except for Sweden, 
which were derived from Sweden, The Swedish Economy: Revised National 
Budget, 1971.2, p. 590. Income figures are net national income except for Brazil 
(net national product) and Nicaragua,  Sweden, and Uruguay (gross domestic 
product). 
On the printout I obtained from Lothian money was defined as the sum of 
“Money”  and  “Quasi-Money’’  (commercial  and mutual  savings-bank  time 
deposits, postal  savings  deposits, and  savings  and  loan  shares where they 
existedhas shown in International Financial Statistics. Adjusted R2 for the 
observations based on this definition of money for the period Lothian covered 
was .877. 